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Abstract: The Shapiro-Stiglitz model plays an important role in the employment theory. Woodford pointed 
out the theoretic limitation of the linear worker's utility function in that model. He questioned the model's 
implication of the secular decline in the unemployment rate when such rate was in fact trendless. He 
proposed to resolve this by allowing diminishing marginal utility of income. In this paper, the Shapiro-
Stiglitz model is generalized using a nonlinear utility function implicit in the Stiglitz Efficiency-wage 
paper, thus linking these two well-known models. The nonlinear utility function in this generalized model 
not only allows for diminishing marginal utility of income but also allows for the analysis of parameters 
representing various factors affecting the secular unemployment rate. In particular, we can specify the 
condition under which the diminishing marginal utility can cause such rate to be trendless.
JEL Classifications: E24; J31; J64 
Keywords: Macroeconomics, Efficiency-Wage, S-shaped Effort Supply, Shirking model.
1  Introduction
Efficiency-wage theory asserts that for various reasons, firms pay above market-clearing wages and thus 
cause unemployment. The static textbook model in this field is based on Stiglitz [1973, 1976] Efficiency 
Wage (SEW) papers, wherein labor supply and demand are replaced by effort supply and demand. The 
effort demand curve is the argmax of the profit function of a representative firm. The effort supply function 
is assumed to be given and S-shaped to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. This supply function 
should be the argmax of a worker’s utility function, yet this underlying utility function was almost never 
made explicit in the literature.1 
Shapiro & Stiglitz [1984] (S-S) introduced the notion that it is costly for a firm to monitor its workers. The 
firm will therefore pay an efficiency wage to prevent shirking. The S-S model is in a dynamic optimization 
setting and has also become standard in macroeconomics textbooks. However, instead of a nonlinear 
worker’s utility function implicit in SEW, Shapiro & Stiglitz employed a more tractable utility function in 
the form of U*(w, λ) = w – λ with w as wage and λ as effort. This U*(w, λ) has constant marginal utility (MU) 
with respect to income. Woodford [1994] noted that such a functional form would preclude the effect of 
household wealth in wage determination and constitute an important theoretic limitation. In addition, 
Woodford maintained that if the S-S model were placed in a growth setting, increases in labor productivity 
over time would shift labor demand upwards and result in a secular decline in the unemployment rate. 
1 See Wu and Ho (2012).
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However, such secular rate had been trendless. Woodford proposed using diminishing MU of income to 
explain why workers’ reservation wages needed to rise with wealth over time. This would cause a rise in 
the no-shirking efficiency wage and increase unemployment, thus explaining the trendless rate. We are 
curious to see if the SEW model utility function can be used to provide an analytical platform for Woodford’s 
conjecture. 
2  Literature Review
In unemployment models, incomplete and asymmetric information plays a major role.
From the incomplete information perspective, Stigler (1961) introduced the notion of an economic agent 
searching for the most favorable price. Different versions of labor market search models were introduced by 
Stigler (1962)2, McCall (1970)3, Mortensen (1970)4 and Pissarides (1976)5. This search feature was integrated 
into a dynamic framework to explain both the efficiency-wage and unemployment over time. For example, 
Salop’s (1979) labor turnover model asserted that firms set higher wages to avoid turnover costs. 
From the asymmetric information perspective, Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) recognized that it is costly for 
the firm to determine and monitor workers’ effort. This motivates the notion of using an efficiency-wage to 
avoid shirking. As we mentioned, Shapiro & Stiglitz’s used the utility function U*(w, λ) = w – λ. Subsequent 
studies in the literature have generally adopted this approach. Based on this utility function, Strand (1987) 
examined the effects of heterogeneous workers on the labor market; Oi (1990) modeled unemployment 
in a dual labor market; Strand (1991) investigated how firm-specific shocks and moral hazard affect 
unemployment and wages; Meier (2002), Holzner et al.(2010) examined the effect of work requirements 
for welfare recipients on the wage rate; Boeria and Jimeno (2005) analyzed employment protections in 
the labor market; Ose (2005) explored the relationship among working conditions, compensation and 
absenteeism. Skott (2006) examined over-education and wage inequality; Sparks (1986) highlighted the 
role of imperfect monitoring and dismissal threats in underpinning real wage rigidity; and Zenou & Smith 
(1995) and Zenou (2006) studied the worker’s decision to live in central business district or urban-fringe; 
Phelps (1994) and Brecher et al. (2010) generalized this model by incorporating asset accumulation and 
modifying the no-shirking condition.
Other articles based on constant marginal utility include Altenburg & Brenken (2008), who studied 
equilibrium unemployment monopolistic competition where workers are paid efficiency wages. Aloi & 
Lloyd-Braga (2010) incorporated constant marginal labor disutility in a two-country general equilibrium 
model to study the relationship between international factor mobility and macroeconomic instability. 
Similar utility functions were also employed in Moen & Rosén (2006), Fuchs (2007) and Yang (2008) when 
studying optimal wage contracts, and in Stähler (2008) when studying judicial mistakes in the labor market.
This worker’s utility function was slightly modified in some other papers. Hendricks & Kahn (1991) 
used the form U** = w – λ2 to consider wage determination in an economy with unionized sectors. Fehr et 
al. (1996) employed the utility function U** = w – g(λ), where g is a convex function, to test the wage effect 
on involuntary unemployment in an experimental market. Walsh (1999) used the same utility function 
U*** to study the pattern of effort and wages in a multi-sector model; Allgulin & Ellingsen (2002) also used 
this utility function in their paper to determine whether monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for 
motivating workers. 
A few papers employed slightly more complex utility function forms. These included Kiley (1997), who 
used the form U## = wh
θ
λ θ)(## hwhU −=  to study the cyclical behavior of real wages and marginal cost; Hoon (2001) 
developed a dynamic Ricardian model of the world economy with the utility function U### = aw – λ.
2 Stigler proposed that one way to reduce a firm’s search cost is to pay higher wage rates.
3 McCall derived the optimal search for an unemployed worker using the distribution of wages in the labor market and search 
costs.
4 Mortensen used a model with heterogeneous workers to calculate the natural rate of unemployment.
5 Pissarides derived a worker’s optimal job acceptance policy by assuming that workers can only have a finite number of 
searches in their lifetime.
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The above literature review shows that most of the studies in labor market unemployment adopt a 
constant marginal utility function. For the few that venture out to nonlinear utility functions, the implication 
of non-constant MU is not analyzed. Woodford (1994) is the exception in proposing to use diminishing MU 
to explain the trendless secular unemployment rate. 
We add parenthetically that a parallel strand of work was initiated by Diamond (1982), Mortensen & 
Pissarides (1994) who added the matching function to the employment process. This allows the firm and 
the worker to interact in a search-matching model. Bertola & Caballero (1994) and Davis (2001) further 
extended the model to include dynamically heterogeneous productivity and search costs across firms. 
Jellal & Zenou (1999) included the quality of job matching in the workers’ effort function to determine the 
efficiency wage. Within a general equilibrium framework, Trigari (2004) combined search and matching 
with a monetary model and used nominal price rigidities to explain economic fluctuations.6 Gertler et 
al. (2008) extended the Trigari (2004) paper to include a government spending shock. Pries (2004), Hall 
(2005) and Shimer (2005) conducted empirical studies to test whether the calibrated search model matches 
the cyclical behavior of the labor market. Lentz (2009) determined the optimal unemployment insurance 
benefit in a search model with savings. Boone & Bovenberg (2004) explored the optimal interaction between 
the tax system and unemployment insurance. Lehmann et al. (2011) determined the optimal redistributive 
taxation policy for heterogeneous workers when search frictions are present.
3  S-S Model with Non-Constant Marginal Utility 
We introduce into the S-S Model a SEW type worker’s utility function in the form of
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.  (1) 
where wt > 0 is the wage and λt(wt) ≥ 0 is the effort at time t. The constant  M > 0 is the utility derived from 
unemployment benefits when the worker is unemployed and M = 0 when he is employed. Constants α > ½, 
β > 1 and γ > 0.7 The two models are thus linked by the same worker’s utility function U. Furthermore, this 
nonlinear function can be used to address Woodford’s concern regarding the limitation of constant MU. 
 As in the S-S model we assume there are a large number of identical firms, N, and a large number of 
identical risk-neutral workers, nF. A firm maximizes its instantaneous real profits Π at each moment t: (Such 
instantaneous maximization applies to each t so we do not need to analyze the present value of profits. We 
simplify the notations by omitting the subscript t for wt and λt(wt)) 
maxπ = max(AF(λ(w)L) – wL), Fʹ(•) > 0, Fʺ (•) < 0.    (2)
L is the number of workers in the firm and F is its production function with λL as the multiplicative input. 
We include a traditional shifter A to illustrate an unusual characteristic of this production function which 
is peculiar to the efficiency-wage theory. Due to the multiplicative term, there will be two conditions for 
maximization, namely
λ(w) AFʹ (λ(w)L) = w      (3)
and 
AFʹ (λ(w)L) λʹL – L.            (4)8
From these two conditions, we can derive a downward sloping labor demand
 
L
Zw = , where Z is some constant.  (5)
6 See Yashiv (2007) for an excellent survey of search and matching models. Pissarides (2000) provides an overview of macroe-
conomic equilibrium unemployment theory.
7 Under static optimization, this U implies an equilibrium similar to that of the SEW model. (See Appendix A.) 
8 (3) and (4) imply the Solow condition 1)(
)('
=
w
ww
λ
λ  and → λʹ(w)>0, which is the crucial assumption of efficiency wage models 
and is implicit in the Stiglitz’s S-shaped curve. 
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Since A is not in the demand function, it cannot be used to shift the function when there is an increase 
in the productivity. Such an increase is now reflected by Z which acts as the shifter. (See Appendix B)
 As in the S-S model the worker has a binary effort choice: λt(wt)= 0 or 0)( >= λλ tt w  (Each worker 
exertingλ contributes 1 unit of effective labor). Let ne be the number of workers who are exerting effort in 
the firm. The firm’s objective is to set w sufficiently high to prevent shirking and find the effective labor ne at 
each moment to maximize its real profits. This is accomplished by hiring workers up to the point where the 
marginal product of effective labor equals the wage (               ) 
 
 
. By the identical firm assumption, 
these firm-level labor demand conditions can be extended to the aggregate level for the whole economy. 
Instead of the S-S model assumption of 
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, we need to assume
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(See Appendix C) to ensure there will be full 
employment if there is perfect monitoring. 
The other S-S model assumptions are: (following rates are per unit time) 
(A-1) an exogenous job breakup rate 0>χ ; 
(A-2) an exogenous shirking detection rate 0>ρ ;
(A-3) the unemployed worker finds employment at the rate θ , which is endogenously determined. 
When the worker maximizes his expected lifetime utility, the value function in state i will be
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  (6)
where r ≥ 0 is the worker’s discount rate. 
There are three possible states for i, namely E, S, and X, where E denotes the state of the worker being 
employed and exerting effort λ ; S the state when the worker is employed and shirking (λ = 0) and X the 
state when the worker is unemployed.
The corresponding value functions are
  χ
χλαλγλ ββ
+
+−−
=
r
VwwV XE
)( 22
  (See Appendix D)      (7)
   ρχ
ρχλβ
++
++
=
r
VwV XS
)(
     (See Appendix E)      (8)
  EX Vrr
MV
θ
θ
θ +
+
+
=      (See Appendix F).    (9) 
Each firm will pay wage that is just sufficient to induce effort. This is done by equating VE with VS resulting 
in 
  
β
λγρχρλ
λρχα
λγρχρλ
ρ 1
2
2
2 ])(
)(
)(
[
++−
++
+
++−
=
r
r
r
Vrw X     (10)
We follow the S-S-model in assuming a steady-state in which the movement in and out of unemployment 
is balanced:
  nnnF χθ =− )( ,    (Note ϴ then is a function of n) (11)
where n = NL is the employment level of all firms. 
From equations (7), (9), and (10), we derive the following “No-Shirking Condition” curve (NSC) which is 
analogous to that of the S-S model: (See Appendix G)
  
β
λγθρχλρ
λαθρχρ
1
2
2
]
)(
)([)(ˆ
+++−
++++
=
r
rMnw , with  (12)
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→ )(ˆ nw  is upward sloping.
 We note that since w and λ cannot move in opposite directions (∵ 0)(' >wλ , see footnote 9) and 1>β
, the term λβw  moves in the same direction as λw . This enables us to use it as a proxy for the worker’s 
income. Our utility function U exhibits diminishing MU characteristics with respect to the income proxy 
λβw .9 
 The comparative statics are straightforward and consistent with the shirking models. When the utility 
from unemployment benefits M in the numerator of )(ˆ nw  is increased, ceteris paribus, the no-shirking wage 
will be raised to induce workers not to shirk.10 If the worker’s disutility from exerting effort α increases, 
the second numerator term 2)( λαθρχ +++r  becomes larger and will increase )(ˆ nw . This means a 
higher no-shirking wage is necessary when there is more disutility. Since equation (12) can be rewritten as 
 β
λγ
ρ
θχ
λ
λα
ρ
θχ
1
2
2
]
)1(
)1(
[)(ˆ
+
++
−
+
++
+
=
r
rM
nw , an increase in the detection rate ρ  will reduce the no-shirking 
wage. Higher degree of diminishing MU (as represented by an increase in the positive value of γ) will 
increase the negative denominator term 2)( λγθρχ +++r  in (12) to raise )(ˆ nw . This shows a higher 
no-shirking wage is needed to compensate for the higher degree of diminishing MU when income rises over 
time.11 
 Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the NSC and labor demand Ld curves. There will be 
unemployment ( * 0EF nn − ) as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Labor market equilibrium (γ = 0 case)
From the labor equilibrium graph, we can analyze the following Woodford’s (1994) statements:
(A) secular growth in labor productivity would reduce unemployment rate; and
(B)  such result can be avoided by abandoning the Shapiro-Stiglitz assumption of constant marginal utility 
of income.
9 U is concave with respect to wβλ (See Appendix H). 
10 This is in line with the Shapiro-Stiglitz assertion that “the existence of unemployment benefits reduces the “penalty” associ-
ated with being fired. Therefore, to induce workers not to shirk, firms must pay higher wages.” (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, p. 434)
11 An increase in γ raises )(ˆ nw  in two ways. (See Appendix G). 
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To reflect the secular growth in labor productivity, Z is increased to Z1 in the labor demand function 
(equation (5)). This will shift the labor demand curve Ld to Ld’ in Figure 1. The equilibrium will move from E0 
to SS-Woodford, where there is a rise in the no-shirking wage and a decline in unemployment. This is the 
statement (A) described by Woodford. 
Figure 2: Effect of an increase in the degree of diminishing MU. 
For statement (B), when γ is increased to γ1 in equation (12), the NSC curve in Figure 2 will be shifted 
upwards; and from equation (13), its slope will steepen. Hence, NSC will be shifted to NSC1. This will reduce 
the employment level. If, over time, this reduction offsets the increase in employment caused by the upward 
shift in labor demand (i.e. Z to Z1), then the secular unemployment rate will be trendless. The condition 
necessary for this to happen is for (Z1, γ1) to conform to 
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(See Figure 3 and Appendix I)
Figure 3: Trendless secular unemployment rate 
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If the trendless secular unemployment rate persists, it might suggest that the intertemporal movements 
of (Z, γ) to (Z1, γ1) follow some related patterns so that the condition (14) will be maintained over time and 
the shifted labor demand and NSC curves will keep intersecting near . This of course can be the subject of 
further research. 
Moreover, it is obvious from our model that the diminishing MU of income is not the only explanation of 
a trendless secular employment rate. An increase in parameters M, r, χ, α, λ  or a decrease in ρ can produce 
the trendless effect, as shown in Figure 3. The policy implication of varying the parameters is interesting. 
For example, policies aimed at increasing the utility of unemployment benefit M can have dampening effect 
on the secular increase in labor productivity. And better detection rate by firms (i.e. an increase in ρ) can 
reduce the no-shirking wage, leading to a further reduction in the unemployment rate. 
4  Conclusion
We find that we can link the SEW and S-S model with a common nonlinear worker’s utility function and 
thus generalize the S-S model by relaxing the constant MU assumption. The parameters in our model enable 
us to make explicit the various factors affecting the secular unemployment rate, as well as to analyze the 
worker’s preference representation regarding income and incentive to work. We can specify the various 
conditions necessary for a trendless unemployment rate. In particular, we specify the condition under 
which Woodford’s conjecture will occur. Besides workers’ diminishing marginal utility of income, other 
factors like rising unemployment benefit or declining shirking detection rate can also help to explain the 
trendless secular unemployment rate.
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